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ife and Action is, by general agreement, a dense and 
difficult book. It is so, no doubt, because of its originality, 
which sometimes borders on idiosyncrasy.1 A naive 
reader is likely to be struck, first of all, by its original combination 
of philosophical radicalism and defense of common sense. 
Thompson (10) himself describes his “investigations” as “a kind 
of exposition of certain aspects of the ‘manifest image’, which 
Wilfrid Sellars familiarly contrasted with the ‘scientific image’.” 
Still, he hastens to clarify that “the expression ‘image’ is inept”, 
because Sellars is actually “contrasting certain systems of 
concepts” (10).2 
In the first part of the book—the section on which I will focus 
henceforth—what the reader gets in return for her efforts, then, 
is not at first glance a reflection based on the empirical experience 
of living things, but an inquiry into the concept of ‘life’ and its 
peculiarity. This, however, is further complicated by the fact that, 
!
1 M. Thompson, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical 
Thought (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2008). Page numbers in the 
text are to this book. 
2 Ibid. p. 25, fn. 5, where “imagination” is bluntly opposed to “conception.” 
L 
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as a result of Thompson’s “analytical or Fregean Aristotelianism” 
(13), the investigation does not focus on the isolated concept and 
its contents (“the things that are thought of under [its] heading”), but 
on a “wider context” which primarily means the sort of judgment 
in which what counts as a living thing (cells, organisms, plants, 
animals, human beings, species) is placed and described. In this 
sense, the distinctiveness of the concept of life or, better, life-
form turns out to be “fundamentally logical in character” (14). 
Thus, the point of the argument does not reside in working out 
an unexceptionable definition of life, but in elucidating what lies 
behind our way of thinking about or representing living things. 
This, in a few words, is the problem to solve. No easy knot to 
unravel, at least for those who, like me, harbor a strong realistic 
intuition about the phenomenon of life and a lack of confidence 
in the possibility of merging without remnants the logical and 
categorical domains, forms of thought and forms of being, 
grammatical usage and ontology. Personally, leaving Hegel’s aside, 
I know only another attempt to conceive of life against a logical 
background: Helmuth Plessner’s theory of organic modals.3 In a 
book even denser than the one discussed here, Plessner 
understands life’s phenomenal manifestations as instantiations of 
“types” or “styles” of being alive, i.e. forms of organization of the 
organic models: those basic qualitative elements, or “non 
decomposable (unauflösbar) and irreducible” properties, that make 
up the subject matter of the philosophical biology developed by 
him in the 1920s.4 Plessner’s theoretical bet was essentially played 
on the claim that an inquiry into the essence (no matter if real or 
nominal) of a natural event does not involve a mere stipulative 
!
3 H. Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften IV: Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1981). See also M. Grene, Approaches to a 
Philosophical Biology (New York: Basic Books 1968), Ch. 2. 
4 H. Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften IV, p. 159. 
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definition of what we mean by it, but a better understanding of its 
immanent sense, that is of its intelligibility conditions or, to use 
an outmoded Aristotelian jargon, of its “formal cause.” 
 The outcome of this theoretical approach is a structurally 
open conceptual exploration, which has the obvious flaw (for 
those who consider it such) that it cannot be neither directly 
confirmed nor disproved by empirical knowledge, because it 
stands behind the field researcher as an ordering principle or a 
background of meaning that, to quote Plessner’s idiosyncratic 
idiom, can only be intuited, but never explained or demonstrated 
as such. 
Plessner’s trust in this kind of intellectual exercises is based on 
the belief that a positive knowledge of nature can be produced 
apart from the method of natural science and that “only when 
one believes that the exact method is the only way to know 
nature, one ends up with denying in the object whatever cannot 
be explained by this method”, while “there is much more in the 
world than what can be verified (feststellbar) therein.”5 In his view, 
therefore, admitting that the categories employed to understand 
the deeper meaning of the realm of life do not coincide with any 
empirical filling, that they do not perfectly overlap with the 
continuum of organic forms which are found in nature, is not a 
fatal theoretical flaw.6 
Thompson claims something along the same lines when he 
argues in his book that the concepts of life, action and practice 
“are not empirical concepts” and ought to be seen “as something 
arising in any given subject from reflection on the pure logical 
forms of the thoughts or judgments she is capable of grasping” 
(19). The same holds for the not perfect overlap between the 
!
5 Ibid., p. 134, p. 172. 
6 Ibid., p. 302. 
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concept of life-form and the biological species concept (199). 
Accordingly, quoting Thompson again, “the division of 
‘categories’ will thus be resistant to the sort of empirical criticism 
that might be raised against a taxonomy of fundamental particles 
or of terrestrial organisms; opposition to the division, like 
elucidation of it, must take place entirely within philosophy” (19). 
In order to make better sense of Thompson’s logical treatment 
of life, I shall start from a slightly different way of tackling the 
issue of life’s seeming indefinability. Some years ago, while 
contributing to a debate on the controversial idea of the “sanctity 
of life”, I was also led to think about the both inescapable and 
elusive concept of life.7 At the time, like Thompson, I was mostly 
impressed by how the notion plays no essential role in any 
established scientific field, paradoxically not even in biology. This 
is a fate shared by two other crucial categories of the age-old 
meditation on the biosphere: form and purpose. This goes so far 
that there are people today who, in spite of the proliferation of all 
that is “organic” or “bio” in our societies, do not hesitate to 
endorse the idea (which has constantly cropped up since the 
beginnings of modern philosophy) that it is time to get rid 
remorselessly of all this empty talk about life, since it is based on 
an incurable conceptual weakness.8 
!
7 P. Costa, “Il fenomeno della vita. Che cosa significa che ‘la vita può essere 
conosciuta solo dalla vita’?”, Fenomenologia e società Vol. 31, N. 4 (2008), pp. 66-
77. 
8 F. Jabr, “Why Life Does Not Really Exist,” Scientific American (2 December 
2013), available at: 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/brainwaves/2013/12/02/why-life-does-
not-really-exist/ 
F. Jabr, “Why Nothing Is Truly Alive,” The New York Times (12 March 2014), 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/opinion/why-nothing-is-
truly-alive.html?_r=0 
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 I summarize now my take on the issue. I will rely on it later as 
a litmus test to shed light on the fruitfulness, scope and 
problematic nature of Thompson’s approach. 
 
I 
The Uses of Life 
The first thing that stands out as we think about the different 
uses of the concept of life, not just in the context of the heated 
debates on the supposed sanctity of life, but also within the 
precincts of relatively young disciplines such as bioethics, 
biopolitics or biolaw, is the wavering between two intuitive 
understandings of the phenomenon of life. On the one hand, 
when life in general (überhaupt) is concerned, it is usually 
conceived of as an enigmatic metaphysical power, property or 
principle, whose oddness evokes the very mystery of the universe 
or God (“can you believe it? There is life!”). Accordingly, life may 
appear as a mystical “élan” or as the motor of Becoming or as a 
gift of an alien Higher Intelligence or as the Source of all values. 
It is seen as something so extraordinary, complex and powerful 
that greatly exceeds the human powers. Once, on the other hand, 
a recognizable face is given to such an impersonal force by means 
of an adjective—often, not by accident, the adjective “human”—, 
the notion tends rather to evoke both a sense of familiarity and of 
primary attachment. And, in actual fact, life is something which 
evokes a feeling of proximity because we are living beings and are 
good at and probably even “designed” by evolution to recognize 
other life-forms, in particular those other “self-movers” who are 
closer to us and with whom it is easier for us to sympathize with.9 
!
9 V. Girotto, T. Pievani, and G. Vallortigara, “Supernatural Beliefs: 
Adaptations for Social Life or Byproducts of Cognitive Adaptations?”, 
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After all, life is covered by an aura of sanctity primarily 
because it is our innermost possession. Life is the one and only 
“Ding an sich” and, revealingly, Husserl’s call to get back “zu den 
Sachen selbst” ringed to the German students of his time as an 
invitation to turn away from a bookish universe to draw on the 
lived experience (Erlebnis) in doing philosophy. Merleau-Ponty 
(2012: 162) played on the same semantic ambivalence in a passage 
of The Phenomenology of Perception, when he claimed that “‘living’ 
(leben) [is] a primordial operation from which it becomes possible 
to ‘live’ (erleben) such and such a world” (“‘Vivre’ (leben) est une 
opération primordiale à partir de laquelle il devient possible de 
‘vivre’ (erleben) tel ou tel monde”).10 To quote an Aristotle’s adage 
reminded by Thompson (27 and 47, fn 11) as well: “to be, for a 
living being, is to live” (vivere viventibus est esse).11 
It is worth asking at this point if this background familiarity as 
such involves any epistemic advantage. Does it grant us a 
privileged access to some form of conceptual clarity on what life 
is ultimately about? Do we know something more on life in 
general just because we are living beings ourselves? Or is the 
opposite true? Is not precisely the fact of being alive that prevents 
us from objectively reflecting on life and its innermost nature? Is 
life something special from an ontological point of view or is it 
so—understandably—only for those beings who represent 
themselves as living creatures? How is it possible to go beyond 
the acknowledgment of a vague family resemblance among the 
living beings known to us (that are not only those which resemble 
us the most) and the restricted goal of understanding in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Behaviour 151 (2014), pp. 385-402; M. Thomson, “The Living Individual and Its 
Kind,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 21, N. 4 (1998), p. 591. 
10 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. D.A. Landes (London: 
Routledge). 
11 See also M. Garcìa, “Vivere viventibus est esse? The Relevance of Life for the 
Understanding of Existence, Philosophisches Jahrbuch Vol. 2 (2012), pp. 347-374. 
Paolo Costa – Where Does Our Understanding of Life Come From? 
 13!
increasingly more precise and detailed manner their specific 
modes of behaving and breeding? And how should we imagine 
this “beyond”? 
I do not think that I am far from the truth if I say that the 
queries underlying Thompson’s investigation in the first part of 
Life and Action belong to the same order of ideas. The passage 
from Hegel’s Science of Logic quoted on p. 25 (emphasis on life’s 
concreteness); Frege’s remark about simple matters from Die 
Grundlagen der Arithmetik (cited on p. 33 ); the choice to start the 
discussion on the concept of life from the definition of it given in 
a “typical college freshman’s biology text” (34); the use of a 
public television nature program in order to exemplify the 
ordinary style of reasoning about life and life-forms (63)—these 
are all ways to draw attention to the commonplaces, conditioned 
reflexes and naiveties characterizing our intuitive understanding 
of the phenomenon of life that legitimately arouse the skeptical 
attitude which is dormant in any philosopher worthy of the name. 
We usually think we know what life is, but as soon as we try to 
dig deeper these certainties quickly crumble. However, our 
familiarity with the phenomenon in question is such that this 




A Hermeneutics of Life 
The task of extending our familiarity with the “living” up to a 
form of rigorous knowledge would seem to lie in the domain of a 
phenomenology of life. But what kind of knowledge should we 
expect from it? 
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A phenomenology of life, if it does exist, ought to be based on 
some form of transcendental reduction, a bracketing of the 
natural attitude, an epoché. In an essay focused on Merleau-Ponty, 
Renaud Barbaras, however, has rightly pointed out—taking a cue 
from Husserl’s distinction between phenomenological psychology 
and transcendental phenomenology—that “life escapes the 
phenomenological reduction […] because it appears again on the 
transcendental level.”12 And it does not do much good to argue 
that we are talking here about life in a “metaphorical sense”, 
because 
even if transcendental life is only metaphorically life, it remains to be seen 
how this metaphor is possible, that is to say, which dimension of 
transcendental activity allows us to establish a relation to biological life. In 
other words, to account for the possibility of the metaphor we would have 
to uncover a living dimension at the transcendental level, that is, a sense of 
life more basic than the difference between transcendental and natural 
consciousness. The fact that Husserl describes the transcendental level by 
using concepts borrowed from life in truth shows that life escapes the 
duality established by transcendental phenomenology. This means that 
“life” in the natural sense, as the basic characteristic of living beings, 
involves a dimension that exceeds the natural level, that overlaps the 
transcendental domain: it seems as if natural life were more than itself, part 
of a more primordial life, the other side of which would be the 
transcendental one. 
Indeed, with regard to human activities, it seems sensible to 
claim that everything is life, including the “life” of the mind. But 
if life is the whole of our experience, what sense can make a 
phenomenology of life except in terms of the subjective genitive? 
Although phenomenology belongs in a strong sense to life—to 
the “phenomenality” of life—it is less clear whether life can really 
!
12 R. Barbaras, A Phenomenology of Life, in T. Carman, M.B.N. Hansen (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2005), pp. 206-230, p. 207. 
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become a (cognitive) possession of phenomenology. In this 
context, the problem of life reveals its connection with the 
problem of the subject and its simultaneous belonging and not 
belonging to the world of experience: life seems to be first and 
foremost the subject (what is always under) and not so much a 
knowable object. The Lebens-welt is primarily a background, and as 
such it would seem fated to remain partially opaque, unable to 
rise above the level of Lebens-welt-anschauung (vitalist ideology), if I 
am permitted to indulge in a pun used by Thompson (35, fn 4) 
himself. Life itself becomes here the world as a place that we 
inhabit and that we explore always from the inside: an 
intermediate space between the transcendence of nature and the 
immanence of the spirit. 
A phenomenology of life, therefore, is bound to remain within 
the boundaries of the lived experience, and then, at most, to 
brood over its deeper meaning, its informal “logic”, its point. 
Replicating a crucial theoretical move of twentieth-century 
philosophy, one could then try to get around the problem of 
transcendental reduction, aiming less to a phenomenology, than 
to a “hermeneutics” of life. Such a diversion would actually draw 
attention on the connection between life and meaning, life and 
form, life and mind, life and purpose. In light of our experience, 
the concept of life would seem to imply that of an organized 
whole whose (prelinguistic) “meaning” emerges from the 
conjunction of the parts, not as an extra, but rather as the 
principle of identification built into the organism itself. As 
Merleau-Ponty remarked in The Structure of Behavior, “the organism 
[…] is an ideal unity”, to the extent that it “means” a form that 
has no other reality besides its particular instantiations in the 
living whole.13 
!
13 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, translated by A. Fisher (Boston: 
Beacon Press 1963), p. 152 
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Unsurprisingly, working out a detailed hermeneutics of the 
living turns out to be a daunting task. Hans Jonas tried to develop 
something along this line in his philosophy of the organism and a 
similar ambition also underpinned the generous, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, attempt by Helmuth Plessner at defining a logic of 
the living form in Die Stufen des Organischen.14 I believe, however, 
that a philosophically shrewder way of thinking through and 
epistemically valorize the “phenomenal autonomy of life”15 does 
not necessarily come down to reiterating a classical philosophical 
move—the self-appointed heroic task of “systematischen 
Begründung”, of discovering the “essential laws of life”, of 
searching for the “essence of foundation and principle”, of 
concocting a doctrine of the “essential laws or categories of 
life”16—but results rather from the endeavor to make out “the 
meaning of the object, the principle of the series which discloses 
it.”17 
This is how one could comprehend the difficult task of 
deciphering the irreducibility of the phenomenon of life, whose 
theoretical bet essentially revolves around the vindication of the 
claim that, in a phenomenological enquiry into the essence of the 
“Lebendigen”, what is a stake is not merely a stipulative definition 
of what is meant by “life”, but a better understanding of the 
inherent meaning of a distinctive realm of agency which, by the 
way, is also the source of the puzzling capacity of “meaning” 
something. 
!
14 H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (New York: 
Harper & Row 1966). 
15 H. Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften IV, p. 32. 
16 Ibid., p. 110, p. 78, p. 123. 
17 J. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by H. Barnes (New York: 
Washington Square Press 1968), p. 8. 
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A hermeneutics of life would, then, be a conceptual 
articulation of a core truth about the biological phenomena which 
cannot be neither directly proved nor disproved by empirical 
knowledge, in so far the scientific investigation presupposes it as 
an interpretive tacit framework. To sum up its overarching aim, 
interpreting life amounts to making the most of the Cartesian 
legacy in order to understand the fundamental duplicity of aspect 
of living things, without succumbing to its hegemonic strain. For 
what matters here is not denying “the extraordinary expediency 
and clarity of the distinction between mental and physical”, which 
unquestionably “captures essential differences in the nature of 
reality,” but avoiding to turn it into an Archimedean leverage 
point that, in spite of all good intentions, may lead to breaking up 




I think that it should be clear by now that there are several 
points of contact between this understanding of the utility and 
urgency of a philosophical engagement with the notion of life, 
which be capable of doing justice to our intuitive apprehension of 
the associated phenomenon, and the view adopted by Thompson. 
He, however, seems to wish something more. What exactly? He 
clearly is not content to remain at the level of a mere articulation 
of a dim or inchoate insight—we could say that he is not satisfied 
with “finding a suitable context in which to say the obvious”, to 
quote a memorable Iris Murdoch’s phrase—and wants to go 
further. Where precisely? I would say, from articulation to 
justification. In other words, he seems interested in overcoming 
!
18 H. Plessner, Gesammelte Schriften IV, p. 79. 
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the view “from within” (or “life pattern recognition”19) and 
replacing it with a sophisticated conceptual analysis of the 
categorial distinctions built into the thought-form where the 
notion of life can be handled and given a coherent 
“representation.” The theoretical outcome is original and 
remarkable. Thompson (3) himself half-seriously depicts it as an 
“Aristotelian scala naturae erected on top of a Fregean 
infrastructure”, in so far as for every “categorial shift in our 
thinking”, there is a corresponding leap in the “form of being we 
apprehend through these thoughts” (3). 
The opening claim that Thompson wishes to warrant is that 
possessing the concept of life does not mean defining life by 
means of a set of exclusive and exhaustive properties (e.g. 
organization, responsiveness to stimuli, metabolism, growth, 
reproduction, etc.) that are supposed to distinguish what is living 
from what is not living, regardless of the context (the empiricist 
delusion). The point is, rather, to be able to make properly use 
and sense of what he calls “natural-historical judgments” (63) and 
the corresponding sentences (“Aristotelian categorical”, 65). 
These are nothing more than descriptions that presuppose the 
broader logical category of life-form as their condition of 
intelligibility. In other words, the special property of being alive 
cannot be grasped if one neglects the “appropriate category of 
form” (52). So, the starting issue is simply a problem of 
description— “How is such a thing described?” (62) —while the 
end goal is to reach the “broader context” that makes possible to 
bring into focus things of this “kind” (that is “alive”). As 
Thompson himself makes clear: “A reference to the life-form is 
already contained in the thought of the individual and its 
vicissitudes” (81). 
!
19 M. Thomson, The Living Individual and Its Kind. 
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The description that is then made possible is a sui generis 
description which, in spite of its assertiveness (“the female bobcat 
gives birth to two to four cubs”, 63), does not entail universal 
quantifiers (“all the female bobcats give birth to two to four 
cubs”) and still makes fully sense in light of what is ultimately 
described. Part of the mystery of life precisely revolves around 
the existence of individuals which are not mere individuals, but 
first of all bearers of a historically contingent form. Recognizing 
this enables us to retain a significant use of the concept of 
species, avoiding the drawbacks of the traditional essentialist 
outlook (which is notoriously abhorred by contemporary 
biologists or at least by their Neo-Darwinian spokespersons in 
the intellectual public sphere). 
If I understand correctly Thompson’s argument, the following 
conclusion is to be drawn from the above: biological species are 
natural kinds in a weak sense.20 That is to say, a representative 
member of a species had better not be seen as an instantiation of 
an ethereal and intemporal Platonic essence, but rather as an 
embedded element of a both natural and inescapable way of 
representing the living world. This is “natural” because we can be 
confident that “the appearances are bene fundata” (76). And it is 
“inescapable” because the natural-historical judgments are “a 
logically special form of appearance of predicative espressions” 
(76), with a distinctive grammar: the “grammar of a life-form-
word” (76). 
I wonder, however, if Thompson’s highly original and 
persuasive argument, rather than as the unquestionable 
conclusion of a subspecies of transcendental argument, would not 
benefit from being conceived of as a compelling elucidation of 
how, within our philosophical and scientific tradition, is possible 
!
20 For a similar view, see M. Grene, “Evolution, ‘Typology’ and ‘Population 
Thinking’,” American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 27, N. 3, pp. 237-243. 
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to offer a coherent linguistic representation of the main facets of 
the “Lebendigen”—of life’s modes of presentation—such as they 
appear within the human life-form. To cut a long story short, I 
ask myself if, viewed from this standpoint, the wider context 
would consist less of a “particular form of general judgment or 
statement” (48), than of the self-correcting efforts made by a self-
aware living organism in order to unravel the riddle of life’s 
duplicity of aspect (inner/outer; active/passive; 
intentional/causal; purposive/mechanic; individual/general).21 




Where do We Go from Here? 
To answer this question, I have to explain what could possibly 
be the leitmotifs of the hermeneutics of life which I am 
suggesting as an alternative to Thompson’s agenda. Here, of 
course, there is room only to draw up a (necessarily incomplete) 
list of the issues around which is likely bound to revolve such a 
mildly naturalistic hermeneutics. Many of them, not surprisingly, 
show more or less explicit ties with images and metaphors which 
philosophical engagements with the phenomenon of life, 
including Thompson’s, had to deal with in the past and still do. 
What emerges then, I think, it is a significant case of overlapping 
!
21 There are signs that Thompson is not at all unsympathetic to this 
argumentative strategy. See especially his engaging as yet unpublished 
manuscript Forms of Nature: “First”, “Second”, “Living”, “Rational” and “Phronetic.” 
See Thompson (forthcoming): passim. 
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consensus, which probably signals the existence of a gap or blind 
spot in western metaphysics.22 
(1) Life & Agency. What the experience of being alive is 
ultimately about? Of course, nobody knows with certainty. Yet, 
arguing at a high level of generality, it seems reasonable to assume 
that life always presupposes some form of agency and that life 
and action are basically synonyms. By agency I mean something 
close to what Thompson makes a convincing case for in the 
second and third part of his book: not mere causal processuality, 
but an almost “symphonic” chain of events that justifies the 
ascription of its upshot to an agent (and, accordingly, something 
like the identification of a point of view or positionality). After all, 
even in Schrödinger’s celebrated view, life does something: it 
strenuously “fights” against entropy.23 
(2) Life & Soul. As one often hears said (more often than not 
unflappably), living matter is an “animated” matter. With this 
expression, people try to put into words the experience of life as 
something throbbing, active, with an independent motility, even a 
kind of rebelliousness to the influence of external forces. From 
this point of view, life is equivalent to dynamism, to desire. With 
a stroke of genius, Kant defined life as “nothing but the faculty of 
desire in its minimal exertion” (Das Leben ist nichts als in der 
Begehrungsvermögen geringsten Ausbüng) in an unpublished 
annotation.24 Life is synonymous with Trieb, Streben or élan, a 
!
22 B.A.G. Fuller, “The Messes Animals Make in Metaphysics,” The Journal of 
Philosophy» Vol. 46 (1949), pp. 829-838. 
23 E. Schrödinger, What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1992), pp. 69-71. See also Fox Keller Refiguring 
Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology (New York: Columbia University Press 
1995), pp. 66-72. 
24 I. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. XV/1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1923), p.  
465. See L. Zammito, “Teleology Then and Now: The Question of Kant’s 
Relevance for Contemporary Controversies over Function in Biology,” Studies 
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striving or propensity towards a final state, be it a precarious 
equilibrium or a condition of homeostasis.25 
(3) Life & Form. Life and form also seem to be inescapably 
connected. Form, of course, means many things. In this case, 
however, it stands first of all for a configuration of relations 
between the parts so sophisticated as to justify the recourse to the 
concept of self-relation. From this point of view, life is 
organization. It is, in other words, arrangement of the parts in a 
meaningful order. (Just think about the whole array of images 
traditionally linked in some way to the organism, including the 
vision of life as the capacity for self-organization and self-
determination, and as a system of meaningful relations that 
evokes, not surprisingly, an influential view of reason.) Otherwise 
put: life is “signification” (Merleau-Ponty), it “says” something 
through the elements that constitute it and refer to something 
beyond itself. (In a way, life can be conceived of as a “mind” 
without representations.) It, therefore, also means dialectics of 
boundaries, the expression of a plasticity different from that 
performed by merely functional unities. Life, according to 
Plessner, is “realization” of the boundary, in so far as the living 
body is not simply de-limited, like any other physical body, but 
“owns” its boundary as the keystone of its dynamic identity, of its 
being in itself and beyond itself all at once. In this case, the 
boundary is not a pure “in-between”, but a threshold, a 
“passageway” (Grenze) and also an opportunity for going up 
against the medium where the bounded being is positioned: 
“When a body, aside from its boundary (Begrenzung), has as its 
property the boundary-crossing (Grenzübergang), then the boundary 
is both a spatial-boundary and an aspect-boundary and the 
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contour, notwithstanding its Gestalt quality, gains the value of the 
form of totality.”26 
(4) Life & Self-Determination. Plessner’s idea of the realization 
of the boundary amounts to translating in abstract terms the fact 
of life’s plasticity, of its distinctive opened form. According to 
Plessner, “the form as a manifestation of boundary is an essential 
indicator of vitality/liveliness (Lebendigkeit).”27 In the case of living 
organisms, the boundary is the condition for the body to pose 
and impose itself, i.e. for its self-affirmation as an autonomous 
entity with regard to (if not against) the medium with which it 
relates. Obviously, this position, this “centering”, is not 
understood in a voluntaristic sense, but as the surfacing of that 
minimal resistance or “rebelliousness” required for the emergence 
of the duplicity of aspect which is an essential characteristic of the 
phenomenon of life. For this appearance of form is also 
equivalent to a peculiar mode of the organic body’s self-relation 
which expresses the tension between exteriority and interiority 
characterizing all living or “autopoietic” things. Precisely because 
it appears under the guise of self-organization (and the presence 
of the prefix “self” here is in itself meaningful), life more or less 
directly evokes the idea of autonomy or self-determination. 
Indeed, the level of complexity required so that the relations 
between the parts give rise to a variety of self-relation allows a 
relative emancipation of the living organism from the 
surrounding environment and the achievement of at least a 
margin of “situated” (or “needful”, as Jonas liked to call it) 
!
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27 Ibid., p. 33. 
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freedom. From every point of view, as Marjorie Grene once 
noted, life implies “a certain freedom of form within form.”28 
(5) Life as a Melody. There is something about living forms 
that suggests that they may be the expression of a “rule” (or an 
idea, a meaning, a principle of constitution) which makes itself 
felt, however, only under the guise of a significant absence. In 
this sense, life is pure “phenomenality” because the Ding an sich of 
which it should be the appearance, is actually not a “thing” at all. 
As is noted by Renaud Barbaras, “the organism is like a musical 
theme that is never played as such and so only appears in its 
variations […] is that unity without which the parts and the 
events would have no meaning but that is never present as such: 
the organism is present as absent, that is, as hidden in the events 
it governs.”29 And again: “The whole, which escapes the 
distinction between being and nonbeing, must therefore be 
defined as that transversal dimension that links all spatiotemporal 
events, as the axis along which the events are equivalent, like a 
melody, which is nothing more than the notes, but precisely as 
they communicate with one another other.”30 The grafting of this 
“transcendence” onto the heart of life itself could explain that 
characteristic feature of living beings whereby they never seem to 
coincide with themselves, and are, as it were, “traversed” by a 
crevice or a gap (which is the source of the aforementioned 
duplicity of aspect). 
(6) Life as bios and as zoê. Although in different proportions, 
life as we know it always displays a more anonymous and a more 
specific, a more passive and a more active side. The two 
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components are played out along a continuum that ranges from 
organisms that seem comparable in every possible way to mere 
replicators, to living beings marked by growing margins of 
“inwardness”, individuality and therefore by something like a 
meaningful, not just numerical, identity. The classic and perhaps 
abused distinction between bios and zoê is precisely rooted in the 
awareness of the existence of a number of (emerging) levels of 
life-forms. And it is here that the characteristic ambivalence of 
the “Lebendigen” comes into view. To the point that, to quote 
Plessner again, we can claim that “one’s own body is not wholly 
placed within the bodily world, but on the contrary is treated as 
the ego’s boundary against the world, as periphery of the 
inwardness. The consequences of occasionalism are avoided if 
one understands one’s own body both as content of the physical 
world and as access to it, as its constitutive principle. My body 
[the body as a center of agency] is both an extended object and a 
bearer of senses, by means of which the ego gets news about an 
external world that transcends it.”31 Thus, Thompson is right in 
claiming that a compelling representation of life is associated with 
a renewed form of scala naturae. 
To conclude: this is just food for thought. However, it gives a 
glimpse of how both mine and Thompson’s approach are 
enveloped by a common theoretical horizon. And this shared 
backdrop has a genealogy leading directly to Aristotle. Thompson 
believes that the “ur-ancestor” of modern biology needs the 
assistance of a distant German descendant—Gottlob Frege. I 
surmise, however, that he can be content with the advices of his 
talented French disciple—Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The truth is 
likely to be somewhere in between. We need a sufficiently 
hospitable, without being confusing, theoretical space where the 
insights included in these two major thought trajectories can be 
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integrated. Together they can considerably broaden our 
understanding of what life is ultimately about. 
